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Many1 students believe that they understand the theoretical
side of religious studies when they know “the theory of
Durkheim,” “the theory of Freud,” or “the theory of Eliade”
(to name only the most popular). This is, of course, a rather
optimistic statement and an oversimplified view of the
authors’ respective works, which certainly cannot be
reduced to one theory. How can this unfortunate situation
be redressed? Could a book take into account the complexity
of each author’s works? Would this book then still be peda-
gogically suited for undergraduate students? These ques-
tions underline the fact that writing an account of classical
theories of religion is not just reproducing known argu-
ments. Such an undertaking has to deal with certain sets of
constraints: the selection of authors, the selection of their
works, the option to proceed by themes or focus on a
restricted number of authors, the necessity of writing clearly
enough for undergraduate students, and the editorial con-
straints limiting the number of pages of a book. It is there-
fore quite tricky to produce a perfect book regarding each of
these aspects, and the decisions of the author will necessar-
ily reflect his own way of “thinking about religion.” Writing
about classical theories thus implies a certain amount of
creativity. One example of coping with these different points
is the recent volume, Thinking about Religion: An Historical
Introduction to Theories of Religion (hereafter ThR), by
Professor Ivan Strenski, principally aimed at undergraduate
students.
The book is organized into three parts including twelve
chapters, each dealing with a major “theory” or “approach”
to religion. In the first part, “The Prehistory of the Study of
Religion: Responses to an Expanding World,” Strenski
argues that the very practice of abstractly thinking about
religion arose as a result of certain “problems of religion.”
This part includes: (Chapter 1) a presentation of early think-
ers about religion (“Naturalism, God-Given Reason, and the
Quest for Natural Religion”) and (Chapter 2), the contribu-
tion of biblical scholars to the study of religion (“The Critique
of Religion Also Begins with the Critique of the Bible”).
The second part, “Classic Nineteenth-Century Theorists
of the Study of Religion: The Quest for the Origins of Religion
in History,” examines four authors who, Strenski maintains,
were primarily concerned with the question of the origins of
religion: (Chapter 3) Max Müller (“The Shock of the Old: Max
Müller’s Search for the Soul in Europe”), (Chapter 4) Edward
Burnett Tylor (“The Shock of the ‘Savage’: Edward Burnett
Tylor, Evolution, and Spirits”), (Chapter 5) William Robert-
son Smith (“Evolution in the Religion of the Bible: William
Robertson Smith”), and (Chapter 6) James George Frazer
(“Setting the Eternal Templates of Salvation: James Frazer”).
The  third  part,  “Classic  Twentieth-Century  Theorists
of the Study of Religion: Defending the Inner Sanctum of
Religious Experience or Storming It,” is devoted to different
theories which, each in its own way, rejected the evolutionist
point of view and acknowledged the role of the subjectivity
in human culture (ThR 166): (Chapter 7) phenomenology of
religion, from Cornelis Tiele to Ninian Smart (“From Evolu-
tion to Religious Experience: Phenomenology of Religion”),
(Chapter  8)  Max  Weber  (“Religious  Experience  Creates
the World of Modern Economy: Max Weber”), (Chapter 9)
Sigmund Freud (“Tales from Underground: Freud and the
Psychoanalytic Origins of Religion”), (Chapter10) Bronislaw
Malinowski (“Bronislaw Malinowski, Bipolarity, and the
‘Sublime Folly’ of Religion”), (Chapter 11) Émile Durkheim
(“Seeing the Sacred with the Social Eye: Émile Durkheim,”
and (Chapter 12) Mircea Eliade (“Mircea Eliade: Turning the
‘Worm  of  Doubt’”).  A  conclusion  (Chapter  13)  provides
the reader with methodological observations and reflexive
remarks (“Science of Religion, the Bible, and Prince Charm-
ing”). The book contains references at the end of each chap-
ter and is richly illustrated. The companion reader, Thinking
about Religion: A Reader (hereafter ThRR), offers source
material relevant to the main book. Both volumes include an
index.
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Since many books examining the classical theories of
religion already exist, we might wonder whether a new book
on that topic is most essential. We can recall, among others,
Jacques Waardenburg’s Classical Approaches to the Study of
Religion, Eric Sharpe’s Comparative Religion, James Samuel
Preus’s Explaining Religion, Hans-Gerhard Kippenberg’s Dis-
covering Religious History in the Modern Age, or Daniel Pals’s
Theories of Religion.2 How then is Strenski’s work in any way
specific? I contend that, even if they are presented as intro-
ductory, these books are not exactly “classical” in the strict
sense of the term, but give rather a fresh insight on other-
wise very well-known theories.
There are at least four important peculiarities of ThR
and ThRR that we have to emphasize: 1) Strenski’s selec-
tion of authors does not completely reproduce the canoni-
cal list of thinkers usually handled in this kind of work; 2)
Strenski adopts a historicizing perspective similar to the
one he previously applied in Four Theories of Myth, and
Durkheim and the Jews of France,3 refusing to deal
abstractly with “theories,” but trying to understand them
by relating them to the intellectual context in which their
authors worked. They are exclusively considered to be his-
torical productions of “theorists,” and not simply as ideas
coming “out of thin air”; 3) Strenski himself avoids judging
the “theories” under examination to be either false or true,
purposeless or useful: he systematically asks “why the the-
orists thought that they were right” (ThR 4). He, therefore,
does not prescribe an “ideal theory” and does not think that
such a theory actually exists, since “[n]o perfect Prince
Charming of theories waits to carry us off to some intellec-
tual paradise” (ThR 4); and 4) the companion reader (ThRR)
includes articles from contemporary scholars (such as Sam-
uel Preus and Robert Segal), providing alternative perspec-
tives on the authors handled in ThR. I shall deal with these
four points before discussing whether such an undertaking
seems pedagogically appropriate for an introductory book,
which aims to be read by students relatively new to the
field.
1. THE NOT SO HOLY “CANON” OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES
Let us underscore three unusual features regarding the
choice of the authors handled in ThR: 1) the entire section
dedicated to the “prehistory of the study of religion” is not a
standard of the “canon” of religious studies (even if Preus’s
Explaining Religion already deals with authors such as Her-
bert of Cherbury or David Hume)4; 2) unlike numerous
works on the history of the study of religion,5 Strenski
devotes one whole chapter to biblical scholars6; and 3) Stren-
ski distinguishes phenomenologists of religion strictly
speaking (ranging from William Brede Kristensen to Ninian
Smart) from Eliade, whose “approach is so unique [ . . . ] that
he merits [a] chapter of his own” (ThR 327).
Since the single act of selecting authors is partly subjec-
tive, it inevitably reflects a specific conception of the whole
field. Indeed, the canonical list of so-called “fathers” of the
discipline is not a revealed datum. It is in itself an historical
production, matching specific interests, and tacitly implying
a specific view of the discipline: why, for example, in the
classical canon take account of Rudolf Otto, and not mention
scholars like Andrew Lang or Sylvain Lévi? Why does the
classical canon not usually include contributions of female
authors, when, for example, a figure such as Jane Harrison
authored significant works?7 We have to note here that
Strenski himself regrets not having been able (for the sake
of the book’s format) to present works of influential authors
like Joachim Wach, Karl Marx, Ludwig Feuerbach,8 Friedrich
Heiler, William James, Carl Jung, Raffaele Pettazoni, and
several other scholars writing in the study of religion today
(ThR 344). So which view of the study of religion underlies
Strenski’s choice?
Strenski’s selection of authors makes it quite evident
that two parallel but more or less opposite ways of studying
religion developed throughout history: the first can be traced
back to the deists (Charles Blount, Matthew Tindal, John
Toland, and others) and was revived by Müller, Tiele, Otto,
or Eliade. These authors would certainly concur in saying
that “religion” exists in itself and that all religions are in fine
concrete manifestations of a shared religious essence. The
second tradition goes back to skeptical philosophers such as
Hume, and was taken further by, among others, Tylor,
Frazer, Durkheim, and Freud.9 These authors are “critics”
rather than “caretakers,” and their perspective can be qual-
ified as “reductionist”: religion is above all the by-product of
various external causes (such as the fear of death, the human
inclination for living in societies, or the functioning of
human mind). Strenski acknowledges the respective impor-
tance of these two streams for the composition of the field
as a whole,10 though he would rather describe himself as a
“critic of religion.”11 Yet the very opposition between “crit-
ics” and “caretakers” is maybe not so clear-cut than what
one could think at first. Strenski illustrates the influence of
these two intellectual traditions upon each other and insists
that this opposition should not be radicalized. For example,
Malinowski, mainly known for being a “critic” of religion, is
depicted as sharing some ideas with the early phenomenol-
ogists of religion (ThR 177). Conversely, Müller’s idealistic
perspective, for example, was informed by philological
methods familiar to proponents of the high criticism of the
Bible, themselves closer to a critical approach to religion
(ThR 63 sqq.). Müller is thus both a “critic” and a “caretaker”
of religion (ThR 132).
In this regard, the inclusion of biblical scholars in the
“canon” is especially welcome. The very fact that the biblical
scholars’ contribution is often played down in historical
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accounts of the field is perhaps ultimately a far echo of the
old-fashioned conviction that the academic study of religion
had to deal with every religion except Christianity and Juda-
ism. Those two traditions were believed to be too special to
be handled on the same scale as other religions, and there-
fore needed special disciplines, distinct from the more gen-
eral study of (other) religions.12 It is, nonetheless, quite
obvious that the rise of the scientific study of the Bible (from
Spinoza to Renan) opened new possibilities for the scientific
study of other “religious” texts. This, for example, is true of
Müller, who worked in Oxford, while the higher criticism of
the Bible was becoming a dominant paradigm among biblical
scholars (ThR 65). Furthermore, certain scholars, having
played a determinant role in the history of the comparative
study of religions, specialized in the Bible (think for example
of Maurice Vernes, or Albert and Jean Réville, at the École
Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris).
Finally, the fact that Eliade is singled out among phe-
nomenologists helps to distinguish several phenomenolo-
gies of religion (ThR 166). For Strenski, even if Eliade shares
ideas with phenomenologists, he does so in a more extreme
way.13 It would therefore surely be a mistake to systemati-
cally address the criticism aimed at one particular author—
say, Eliade14—to other phenomenologists (such as Smart) for
the alleged reason that they would all work equally from a
phenomenological perspective. Strenski looks for the histor-
ical factors determining the rise of phenomenology of reli-
gion and sees it mainly as a reaction against the extreme
evolutionist explanations of the late nineteenth century. In
that framework, Tiele is depicted as one of the precursors of
the phenomenology of religion, having conciliated a kind of
softened evolutionism with a morphological view on religion
(ThR 169 sqq.). Tiele’s contribution was thus quite decisive,
in that he brought new ideas that were reinterpreted by later
authors (in particular, William Brede Kristensen and Gerar-
dus Van der Leeuw). One should nevertheless remain aware
that Tiele also developed unambiguously apologetic argu-
ments for Christianity in several of his works, and in
particular, in the article “Religions” of the Encyclopaedia
Britannica.15 Tiele’s morphology of religions was unfortu-
nately biased from the very beginning.16 All things consid-
ered, Strenski’s treatment of Tiele (ThR 167-73) could maybe
have been a little briefer, allowing him to develop more
thoroughly the contributions of Kristensen or Van der
Leeuw.
2. THEORIES IN CONTEXT
As stated in the subtitle (An Historical Introduction), ThR
proposes an historical approach to theories of religion. The
author proceeds rather chronologically, from precursors of
the study of religion to twentieth century’s scholars, but the
term “historical” is not just here as a synonym for “chrono-
logical.” The work of Strenski can be said to be historical in
quite another meaning of the term. He aims to present the
“theories” in a contextualized way, which implies a tentative
reconstruction of their respective historical settings.
Explaining his methodology, Strenski states in Four Theories
of Myth in Twentieth Century: “As an alternative to the study
of theory through texts alone, I am [ . . . ] proposing a style
of intellectual history radically informed by the study of
context and recovery of intention.”17 This view of history is
held by, among others, the British historian Quentin Skin-
ner, to whom Strenski refers in a number of his other books.
Skinner writes, in a typical statement of a famous article,
“Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” that
“the essential question which we therefore confront, in
studying any given text, is what its author, in writing at the
time he did write for the audience he intended to address,
could in practice have been intending to communicate by the
utterance of this given utterance.”18 The focus then turns
from the texts as autonomous documents to the author’s
intentions and to the possible audience for whom he wrote
at his time. The main point of Skinner’s work is to avoid
separating ideas or “theories” from their historical context
and discuss them as if they were eternal truths. In particular,
Skinner criticizes historical surveys of a reified idea (e.g.
social contract, separation of powers, doctrine of equality,
etc.) considered as having always been there, only waiting
to be discovered. Such a premise could result in two kinds
of anachronisms: 1) “pointing out earlier ‘anticipations’ of
later doctrines, and [ . . . ] crediting each writer in terms of
this clairvoyance”19; and 2) conversely, negatively judging a
writer for not having fully developed the canonical version
of a theory, idea, or argument.20 As Strenski’s works show,
Skinner’s recommendations seem to be a good way to (at
least partially) solve certain classical methodological prob-
lems linked with the very category of “religion.”
Indeed, even if Strenski does not make the point explic-
itly in ThR, one of the main problems with the category of
“religion” is that it is continuously redefined according to
the particular interests of particular writers.21 This single
fact, widely acknowledged in contemporary studies,22 makes
it difficult to carry out a study of theories of religion taken
out of their respective contexts of production (for the reason
that they would allegedly all deal with “religion”). Such a
perspective would actually be legitimate if the concept of
“religion” explained or dealt with by every “theorist of reli-
gion” was an objective matter, not subject to change (each
author providing a new perspective on a constant object).
Unless we can prove that “religion” is an objective matter,
the study of theories of religion needs first to enquire as to
how “religion” was defined or “constructed” in each specific
context. The notion of “theory” itself has to be used with
some caution, since not every author examined in ThR
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consciously produced one theory of religion. Strenski is well
aware of this problem and speaks rather of “theoretical
ideas” than of “theories,” strictly speaking.23
At that point, we have to be aware of another pitfall. If
we radicalize this particularist (or nominalist) perspective,
we could raise the conclusion that, in fine, no possible intel-
lectual history of the study of religion exists at all, but only
discrete histories of specific works, dealing each with its
particular set of questions, with a particular definition of
“religion.” Indeed, Skinner himself is not far from such a
point of view when he states, “it must be a mistake even to
try [ . . . ] to write histories of ideas tracing the morphology
of a given concept over the time.”24 How does Strenski cope
with this problem?
As he argues in another paper, “Why It Is Better to
Know Some of the Questions than All of the Answers,”
unlike definitions of religion, certain problems of religion
have remained more or less constant throughout history.25
Rather than the history of the study of “religion” as an
object, we should therefore turn to the history of “problems
of religion.”26 There are common sets of problems and
questions that are handled by more than one “theorist of
religion,” and that represent key topics for the develop-
ment of the study of religions: the origin of religion, the
mere presence of several religions, the claim of truth of
each religion, the function of religion, etc. These questions
partly arose as reactions to crucial historical events or pro-
cesses, such as the Great Discoveries, the Reformation,
European wars of religion, the Enlightenment, the Chris-
tian missions, Western colonialism or secularization. It is
in addressing these “problems of religion” that the study of
religion became a real necessity. This viewpoint is con-
stantly reflected in ThR, and the first chapter begins with
the following statement: “People began studying religion
because people were having ‘big’ problems concerning
religion—fundamental problems about the very nature of
religion. What was the first religion? How many religions
are there really? Is religion a good thing? Have people
always been religious?” (ThR 9). Each chapter is thus built
around one problem of religion, “emergent at a particular
time because of various changes that occur in a society”
(ThR 5). As in Four Theories of Myth in Twentieth Century,
Strenski adopts a “soft” version of Skinner’s historical par-
ticularism; he would not concur in saying that each “the-
ory” about religion is incommensurate with each other.27
The red thread is not anymore the very idea of “religion,”
but the complex effects this idea had in history. Strenski’s
goal is therefore to see at the same time “the trees and the
forest” (ThR 4), that is, the meaning of one work considered
in its own historical and biographical context, and the
place (and “effect”) of the work within the global context of
the history of the study of religions.
One can look at, for instance, Weber’s works on religion.
According to Strenski, the biographical details of his life can
contribute to new insights on his ideas. It is thus likely that
Weber’s intellectual work was influenced by the recurring
tensions between his two parents. His mother was a pious
Lutheran, while his father rather was a rationalist, princi-
pally worried about worldly matters. Thus “[i]n a way, Weber
could not live with religion, nor could he live without it. He
might well have avoided considering religion as active and
important in the world, but his conscientious scholarship
simply prevented him from denying what he came to learn”
(ThR 203). Similarly, the mere fact of Weber’s birthplace,
Erfurt, which was at that time (second half of the nineteenth
century) almost equally divided between Protestants and
Catholics, could have developed his sensitivity to the com-
parison of cultures. Strenski indeed argues that “[t]his per-
ception of difference seems to have left an indelible imprint
on Weber that is evident in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit
of Capitalism.”28
The agenda of reconstructing a biographical and intel-
lectual context is certainly a difficult one, and one must
concede the tentative aspect of certain historical interpreta-
tions, especially for authors having lived and worked in a
now-remote past, whose writings would deserve further
historical investigation. Nevertheless, Strenski succeeds in
this task, presenting concurrently the theories, the theo-
rists, and their historical context in an informed way. For
some topics, such as Durkheim and the French sociological
school, Strenski is certainly one of the leading scholars
working towards a reconstruction of this intellectual milieu
today.29
3. “THE STUDY OF RELIGION WITHOUT METAPHYSICS”: 
FROM A HISTORICAL STUDY OF THEORIES OF RELIGION TO A 
HISTORICAL STUDY OF RELIGION
In the last chapter of ThR, Strenski defends a nondogmatic
point of view toward theories of religion. Nearly every
perspective examined in the book (in particular, Durkheim,
Eliade, Freud, Malinowski, Tylor, and Weber) still has its
followers, and it is certainly not possible to restrict the very
name of “historian of religion”/“scholar of religion” to one
paradigm only. Each view is legitimate to qualify as an
approach to the study of religion.30 This generous statement
is certainly to be welcomed, for the book is primarily
conceived as an introduction for students who primarily
need a fair account of available theories. Nevertheless, two
questions can be raised at this point: 1) in its noble will to
be “nondogmatic,” can the study of religion work with any
kind of theory of religion? 2) After all, is the historical per-
spective that Strenski himself uses in his presentations of
theories not particularly relevant for the study of “religious”
phenomena?
13
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Let us examine briefly these two questions. Although he
does not directly address the problem of a theory’s validity
in ThR, Strenski is quite explicit about it in other writings.
In a paper published in a collective work examining the
conflictual relationship between theology and the study of
religion,31 Strenski deals with a well-known argument,
inspired by postmodern philosophy: that no theory can be
ideologically neutral, that theological theories are no more
ideologically oriented than others, and that an author like
Karl Barth therefore should be considered a major figure in
the field of religious studies.32 The answer is clear:
In its parochialism and abject ignorance, the Barthian
position is not only embarrassing for its coarse ignorance
of the religions, but also offensive to the dignity of the
spiritual and religious lives of literally billions of fellow
human beings. [ . . . ] Barthian theology cannot challenge
any sort of intellectual paradigm—whether of religious
studies or not—because its position on religion is hope-
lessly sectarian and dogmatic.33
Consequently, not every position can be validated as a the-
ory to be included in the canon of religious studies. Classical
writers like Durkheim or Freud provided theories that can
be applied to a large range of facts and do not directly
emerge from a dogmatic point of view. At the same time,
Strenski maintains (ThR: 339 sqq.), it would be a mistake to
negate completely the religious motivations contributing to
the rise of the study of religion. Strenski here refers to a
recent book of Russell T. McCutcheon,34 whom he criticizes
for trying to wipe out any metaphysical foundation for the
study of religion. “Indeed history teaches precisely the oppo-
site lesson. Most founders of the study of religion felt that it
was only by virtue of the God-given nature of reason that
their researches into religion were possible!” (ThR 339).
McCutcheon’s suggestion to eradicate any theistic founda-
tion would ironically, according to Strenski, “reintroduce
metaphysics in the field” (ThR: 340), but a naturalist meta-
physics. Strenski concludes: “[N]o [ . . . ] metaphysical foun-
dation, supernaturalist or naturalist, is required for doing
the study of religion” (ThR 340).
We turn now to our second question, the place of history
among various theories of religion. Strenski suggests, inde-
pendent of the question of metaphysical foundations, that we
need rules of evidence just as we need them in courts of law,
which “do not require us to prove or disprove the existence
of a supernatural world” (ThR 341). In ThR, these rules—
which are necessary for a fruitful collaboration between
researchers—are not specifically articulated (and it is cer-
tainly not the purpose of the book to describe them). Reading
the author, we however wonder whether the very historical
method he uses for studying theories and theorists of reli-
gion would not be fit as well for the study of “religious facts”
themselves. The methodological difficulties implied by a
study of theories of religion and those of a work on “religious
facts” are quite similar, and both need context in order to
make sense of the phenomenon under examination. Does
such an historical awareness not constitute a basic require-
ment for the scholars of religion today before explaining and
interpreting facts according to various theories? For that
purpose, Skinner’s methodology, which aims to recover the
meaning of historical facts for their actors (equivalent to the
emic standpoint in standard anthropological vocabulary), is
of particular interest. This also means greater attention to
the documents themselves (the way they were redacted,
etc.), which is one lesson that students of religion can retain
from the higher criticism of the Bible.35 In the same vein, we
can recall the following statement of Morton Smith, who
argued almost forty years ago, “The science of religion, for
which [ . . . ] histories of particular religions are prerequi-
sites, is still far in future. But, when and if it comes, both it,
and the individual histories already developing, will be
shaped by a basic supposition of sound historical method.”36
4. THEORIES AND THEORISTS IN RELATION
The companion reader (ThRR) equally reflects Strenski’s his-
torical methodology, aiming to recast a number of classic
texts in the intellectual setting prevalent at the time of their
composition. This can be seen in three features of ThRR.
First, Strenski often selects excerpts from several works
(and not only one long one from the most famous work of a
given author), which helps the student to see the ideas of a
writer as parts of a bigger work, and not simply as represen-
tatives of “his theory.” For example, in dealing with Tylor,
Strenski gives one excerpt from his Anahuac: Or Mexico and
the Mexicans, Ancient and Modern, as well as one from his
better known Primitive Culture.
Second, ThRR also includes reviews of the works of
“classical authors” written shortly after the time of their
publication. Take for example the review of Müller’s Chips37
by the American sanskritist, William Dwight Whitney,
which demonstrates that the criticism addressed to Müller’s
romanticism is in no way a modern one. Many of Whitney’s
arguments have indeed not lost anything of their relevancy
today. The “Souvenir of Malinowski” by Lévi-Strauss is also
a relatively unknown piece of text, which shows concur-
rently the deep respect Lévi-Strauss had for Malinowski and
the irreducible points of divergence between the two think-
ers (ThRR 182-83).
Third, ThRR also reproduces recent contributions of con-
temporary scholars in order to help students understand
what the present relevance of a given theory could be. As far
as I can tell, it is one of the first anthologies to include recent
views on the works of older authors. Especially appreciated,
for example, is the paper by Segal on Hume (“Hume’s Natu-
ral History of Religion and the Beginning of the Social Scien-
tific Study of Religion”), in which it is argued that Hume can
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be considered a forefather of the modern study of religion.38
This feature also provides the student with alternative per-
spectives to Strenski’s treatment of theories and authors
handled in the main book.39
5. AN APPROPRIATE INTRODUCTION FOR 
STUDENTS OF RELIGION?
What is the most efficient way of teaching the main theories
of religion to beginner students? What are the pedagogical
consequences of a perspective focusing on the historical
settings of theories rather than on the theories themselves?
It would seem that this approach leads to quite a complicated
picture, making it more difficult for students to grasp the
nature of the theories. In reality, the opposite appears to be
true. Even if the “theories” are presented with greater
nuance (which makes them more complex than their tradi-
tionally conveyed image), their intellectual and historical
context makes them more easily understood. Let us take an
example: the attraction of Müller towards nature could seem
strange to a contemporary student. Why would one think
that the “first religion” was a “religion of nature?” How could
the Indian Vedas reflect this natural state of religion? By
linking Müller to the deists and to German romanticism, by
recasting him in the cultural and political context of his time,
and by showing the way in which vedic texts can be inter-
preted according to this worldview,40 it becomes easier to
understand why it was important at that time to “think about
religion” in such terms. In a way, Müller’s work will sud-
denly appear “logical.” Were we to think of Müller not in his
terms, but in our own, we would be forced to conclude that
what he said is not relevant for the contemporary study of
religion anymore, or that it is simply wrong. In my opinion,
a proper understanding of a theory needs contextualization,
and more specifically, needs to inquire about how the object
the theory is supposed to explain was defined (or con-
structed) by a particular author at a particular time. This also
has relevance for the actual practice of theorizing, in that it
makes students aware of the hidden issues at stake behind
any theory (including the ones they could themselves
produce).41
Moreover, Strenski is constantly concerned with mak-
ing his text understandable42 and the books are written in a
pleasant way (sometimes not without a certain sense of
humour). For the above mentioned reasons, I believe Stren-
ski’s work to be pedagogically suited for students beginning
in the field, and hope that this work will be widely used in
introductory classes in the study of religion.
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Kristensen,  A. Lang, L. Lévy-Bruhl,  R. Lowie, B. Malinowski,
R. Marett, M. Mauss, M. Müller, M. Nilsson, R. Otto, W. Otto,
R. Pettazzoni, A. Radcliffe-Brown, P. Radin, E. Renan, W.
Robertson Smith, M. Scheler, W. Schmidt, A. Schweitzer, N.
Söderblom, H. Spencer, C. Tiele, E. B. Tylor, G. Van der Leeuw,
A. Van Gennep, J.  Wach, M. Weber,  J.  Wellhausen. Pals’s
Eight Theories includes theories of E. Durkheim, M. Eliade, E.
Evans-Pritchard, J. G. Frazer, S. Freud, C. Geertz, K. Marx, E.
B. Tylor and M. Weber. Preus’s Explaining Religion deals with
J. Bodin, H. of Cherbury, A. Comte, E. Durkheim, B. Fontenelle,
S. Freud, D. Hume, E. B. Tylor and G. Vico.
5. Strenski prefers the term “study of religion” (ThR 338 sqq.)
even if he occasionally uses the expression “religious studies”
(ThR 338-39, in the titles).
6. Strenski is not completely alone on that point: Waardenburg
too  mentions  the  works  of  several  biblical  scholars  (E.
Renan, J. Wellhausen . . . ) among the “classical approaches”
on religion.
7. Waardenburg, for example, does not mention any female
author in his Classical Approaches. Strenski mentions female
contributions, mainly in link with Malinowski (ThR 279-81).
Kippenberg devotes several pages (105-11) to Jane Harrison.
8. For reasons which could be in themselves worth research, L.
Feuerbach and K. Marx are often forgotten in surveys of clas-
sical authors of the study of religion (note the exception of
Pals’ Seven Theories).
9. As is shown by Sharpe, Eric J., Comparative Religion, p. 267
sqq. These two streams are still to be observed and often raise
conflicts in major congresses of the field.
10. Compare with the historical sketch suggested by Preus’s
Explaining Religion, which roots the contemporary study of
religion exclusively in the tradition of skepticism, while ignor-
ing the whole phenomenological school. For Preus, “[t]he
study of religion issues from criticism of religion.” (p. 82)
11. In ThR 338 Strenski calls himself “a proponent of what one
might call a naturalistic (or nontheological) approach to the
study of religion.”
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12. As Strenski interestingly recalls (ThR 299), this “exceptional-
ist” position is reflected by, among many others, Chantepie de
la Saussaye, who deliberately excluded Christianity and Juda-
ism from his Manuel d’histoire des religions (1887-89). Simi-
larly (ThR 66-67), Müller’s Sacred Books of the East does not
include texts relevant to Judaism or Christianity (which Müller
bitterly regretted).
13. Cf. ThR 311-13.
14. Strenski underlines several problematic aspects of Eliade’s
work and in particular Eliade’s ambivalence toward history
(ThR 313). On this point, Strenski quotes Dudley, Guilford,
Religion on Trial: Mircea Eliade and His Critics, Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1977, p. 148, who had called Eliade
an “anti-historian of religion.”
15. See “Religions” in Encyclopaedia Britannica. Ninth Edition,
Edinburgh: A. and C. Black, vol. 20, 1884, p. 369: “If religion
really is the synthesis of dependence and liberty, we might say
that Islâm represents the former, Buddhism the latter element
only, while Christianity does full justice to both of them. Chris-
tianity [ . . . ] has fused dependence and liberty, the divine and
the human, religion and ethics into an indivisible unity.” See
also his Elements of the Science of Religion. Part 1: Morpholog-
ical, Edinburgh/London: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1897, t. 1,
pp. 208-12.
16. In this sense, Tiele not only tried to “establish the existence
and character of the noumenal ‘religion-as-such’” (ThR 173),
but also repeatedly presented Christianity as the most devel-
oped manifestation of this essence of religion, which results in
a prominent place among the “world religions,” themselves
superior to other religions.
17. Strenski, Four Theories of Myth in Twentieth Century, p. 10. In
ThR like in Four Theories of Myth, Strenski describes the “inter-
nal context” (i.e., the biographical and intellectual contexts of
the writers) as well as the “external context” (i.e., the larger
cultural context, including political, religious, economic, etc.
aspects).
18. Skinner, Quentin, “Meaning and Understanding in the History
of Ideas” in History and Theory 8 (1), 1969, pp. 48-49. For a
criticism of Skinner’s approach, see Tully, James (Ed.), Mean-
ing and Context. Quentin Skinner and his Critics, Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1988, pp. 135-228.
19. Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding . . . ”, p. 11.
20. Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding . . . ”, p. 12.
21. The book of Despland, Michel, La religion en Occident. Evolu-
tion des idées et du vécu, Montréal: Fides 1979, makes it clear
that the meaning of the concept evolved through the ages, even
if we can distinguish schools of thought between authors.
22. Thus Alles, Gregory D., “Religion [Further Considerations]” in
Encyclopedia of Religion. Second Edition, Jones, Lindsay (Ed.),
2005, vol. 11, pp. 7704-5, in particular: “it is widely thought
today that definitions are specific to contexts and purposes,
and  there  is  no  reason  religion  should  be  any  different”
(p. 7705).
23. ThR 342: “In looking closely at the classic ‘theories’ of religion
in Thinking about Religion, I have finally tried to reveal what
so-called ‘theories’ of religion really are. In truth, I think we
would conclude that they are not ‘theories’ at all, but at best
theoretical ideas.”
24. Skinner, Quentin, “Meaning and Understanding . . . ”, p. 48.
25. Strenski, Ivan, “Why It Is Better to Know Some of the Ques-
tions than All of the Answers” in Method and Theory in the
Study of Religion 15/2 (2003), p. 171, and ThR 1-3.
26. In “Why It Is Better . . . ,” p. 172, Strenski refers to Karl Popper
(Objective Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973)
and shows that the very attempt to solve such problems con-
stitutes the core of theoretical activity. The point is not about
actually solving these problems but rather about trying.
27. See Strenski’s critique of Skinner in Strenski, Ivan, Four The-
ories of Myth, p. 195: “I aim to soften Skinner’s radical histor-
ical particularism.”
28. ThR 203. In his treatment of Weber (ThR 198-232), Strenski
almost exclusively refers to The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit
of Capitalism and unfortunately bypasses important aspects of
Weber’s other works (e.g., the distinctions between “proph-
ets,” “priests,” and “magicians,” the question of the institution-
alization of religion, or the notion of charisma).
29. See Strenski, Ivan, The New Durkheim, New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press,  2006. Among other scholars having
adopted a similar  approach  to  Durkheim,  see  Jones,  Robert
Alun, Emile Durkheim: an Introduction to Four Major Works,
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1986.
30. Thus ThR 337: “The study of religion is notoriously peopled
by Weberians, Durkheimians, Freudians, Chicago School (Eli-
ade) products, biblical critics working in the spirit of Spinoza
or Robertson Smith, functionalists thinking about religion
much as Malinowski did, anthropologists of religion tracing
their lineage to Tylor and beyond, cross-cultural comparativ-
ists of many sorts, such as those working in the light cast by
Max Müller or even Frazer, and finally the many species of
phenomenologists—both of the classic variety or of the more
recent vintage exemplified by Ninian Smart or Mircea
Eliade.”
31. Strenski, Ivan, “Why Theology Won’t Work” in Religious Stud-
ies, Theology, and the University. Conflicting Maps, Changing
Terrain, Cady, L. E., and Brown, D. (Eds.),  Albany, NY: SUNY
Press, 2002, pp. 31-44.
32. The point is argued by Green, Garrett, “Challenging the Reli-
gious Studies Canon: Karl Barth’s Theory of Religion,” The
Journal of Religion 75 (1995).
33. Strenski, Ivan, “Why Theology Won’t Work,” p. 35.
34. McCutcheon, Russell T., Critics, Not Caretakers. Redescribing
the Public Study of Religion, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001.
35. Strenski precisely underlines the relevancy of the higher crit-
icism of the Bible school for the contemporary study of religion
(ThR 342).
36. Smith, Morton, “Historical Method in the Study of Religion,”
History and Theory 8 (1968), Beiheft 8: On Method in the His-
tory of Religions, p. 12. See also, in the same paper, the sharp
critique of Eliade’s antihistoricism (pp. 14-15).
37. ThRR 61-64. For an unknown reason (probably a printing mis-
take), in ThRR, Strenski refers to Chips from a German Work-
shop as Chips from a German Woodshop [sic].
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38. ThRR 13-22. The paper was originally published in Religion 24
(3), 1994, pp. 225-34.
39. This is especially true for the inclusion of the article entitled
“Mircea Eliade: Apologia pro Opere Suo”, in ThRR 241-47,
whose author, Bryan Rennie, is, according to Strenski, “critical
of the criticisms leveled by the editor of this reader [sc. Stren-
ski himself] at Eliade’s work.”
40. Strenski actually quotes a portion of the g Veda (ThR 79) to
demonstrate what aspects of the text possibly excited the inter-
est of Müller.
R.
41. I therefore do not agree with Donald Wiebe’s review of ThR,
The Catholic Historical Review 92.3 (2006), p. 279, who finds
making the students “understand how and why some remark-
able folk thought about religion” (ThR 6) “an inadequate goal
for a book meant to introduce students to the importance of
theory in the study of religion.”
42. Take for example the helpful remarks on the terms of “natural
religion,” “naturism,” and “religion of nature,” in ThR 68-69.
